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Introduction
As recognized in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, "it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a
last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights
should be protected by the rule of law."' Although expressed nearly sixty-
four years ago, this prescient affirmation of the need to continually protect
human rights by the rule of law, and the interrelated need for rebellion
against tyranny and oppression when relevant human rights are trampled,
is clearly relevant to what some have termed the Arab Spring of 2011-2012
and the rebellion by individuals and groups against tyranny and oppres-
sion in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria.
t Mike & Teresa Baker Law Center Professor, University of Houston.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, pmbl., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(II) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. For more informa-
tion on the evolution into customary international law of most of the human rights
reflected in the Universal Declaration as well as the role of these rights as authoritative
indicia of the content of human rights guaranteed to all persons through the United
Nations Charter, see, for example, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882-83 (2d Cir.
1980) (stating that with respect to "the 'human rights and fundamental freedoms' guar-
anteed to all by the Charter, . . . [the prohibition of torture] has become part of custom-
ary international law, as evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights .... The General Assembly has declared that the Charter precepts embodied in
this Universal Declaration 'constitute basic principles of international law.' . . . (Tihe
Universal Declaration . . . 'is . . . an authoritative statement of the international commu-
nity."'); THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 39-44
(3d ed. 2002); HURST HANNUM, S. JAMES ANAYA & DINAH L. SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAw, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 152-65, 167 (5th ed. 2011);
MYRES S. McDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 272-74, 302, 325-30 (1980);JoRDANJ. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 254 n.182, 273 n.372, 284 n.468 (2d ed. 2003).
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More recently, various individual and group participants in the Arab
Spring have embraced and reaffirmed predominant patterns of human
expectation and claims occurring worldwide regarding individual dignity
and worth; self-determination of peoples; human rights with respect to rel-
atively free and genuine participation in governmental processes and the
standard of legitimacy for governments; democracy as a universal core
value; and the right of rebellion or revolution and the concomitant right of
a given people to seek self-determination assistance.
Each of these forms of human expectation has a long history, and the
exact contours of each and their interrelation and effectuation are still
unfolding in the Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere. Each form also
has a present legal and policy mooring in basic international legal instru-
ments, including the United Nations Charter and a number of authoritative
human rights instruments. Therefore, one must address relevant norms
and policies set forth in such instruments as part of an adequate interna-
tional legal and policy analysis of non-state actor expectations and actions
that have taken place during the Arab Spring as well as the international
community's responses to them. Importantly, one must also keep in mind
that international law has never been merely state-to-state, as it might be if
states were the only formal actors in the international legal process with
rights and duties or if private individuals and groups did not also have
human rights duties. 2 Among early U.S. recognitions of private human
rights duties was President Thomas Jefferson's Sixth Annual Message to
Congress, in which he formally approved the withdrawal of "'citizens of the
United States from all further participation in those violations of human
rights . . . so long continued on the unoffending inhabitants of Africa." 3
I. General International Legal Policies at Stake
A. Human Dignity
Human dignity is a fundamental international legal precept. The right
to human dignity is part of universal human rights law that is expressly
related to the value and worth of each human being as well as the equality
of men and women.4 As the United Nations Charter declares, when creat-
ing the Charter in 1945 the peoples of the United Nations had been deter-
2. See, e.g., JordanJ. Paust, Nonstate Actor Participation in International Law and the
Pretense of Exclusion, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 977 (2011) (also documenting certain formal
participatory roles of nations, peoples, cities, tribes, belligerents, and insurgents and
identifying informal participatory roles of other non-state actors) [hereinafter Paust,
Nonstate Actors]; JordanJ. Paust, The Reality of Private Rights, Duties, and Participation in
the International Legal Process, 25 MicH. J. INT'L L. 1229 (2004) [hereinafter Paust, The
Reality of Private Rights and Duties]; D.A. Jeremy Telman, Non-State Actors in the Middle
East: A Challenge for Rationalist Legal Theory, 46 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 5 (2013); infra notes
47, 56.
3. PAUST, supra note 1, at 202; see also United States v. Haun, 26 F. Cas. 227, 231
(C.C.S.D. Ala. 1860) (No. 15,329).
4. See, e.g.,JordanJ. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: Ajurispruden-
tially Based Inquiry Into Criteria and Content, 27 How. LJ. 145, 146-47, 185-86, 193
(1984).
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mined to reaffirm their "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and
of nations large and small ... ."5 The United Nations Charter also recog-
nizes the global nature of each member's obligation "to take joint and sepa-
rate action"6 to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights"7 and thus, universal respect for and observance of human dignity.
As noted in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Dec-
laration was promulgated in part to provide "a common understanding of
these [Charter-based] rights . . . ."In fact, the first article set forth in the
Declaration expressed the expectation that "[aill human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights."9 With respect to freedom, justice,
and peace, the Declaration also proclaimed that "recognition of the inher-
ent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
world,"' 0 an expression that also appears verbatim in the preambles to the
two main global human rights treaties, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR)'" and the International Covenant on Eco-
5. U.N. Charter, pmbl. Importantly, the Charter requires that human rights be
respected and observed "for all without distinction as to ... sex . .. or religion." Id. arts.
1, para. 3, 55, para. c.
6. Id. art. 56.
7. Id. art. 55, para. c. The duty of universal respect and observance is necessarily
operative both internally and externally. It applies in all social contexts and is without
geographic or temporal limitations. Any limits regarding the reach of human rights are
found in human rights law, and, as often recognized, some human rights are absolute
and non-derogable.
8. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, pmbl.
9. Id. art. 1. Other human rights instruments also embrace human dignity. See,
e.g., Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, pmbl., arts.
1, 3(a), U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 106, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13,
2006); Arab Charter on Human Rights pmbl. ("dignity of the human person"), arts. 2(3)
("human dignity"), 3(3) ("human dignity"), 17 ("dignity"), 20(1) ("inherent dignity of
the human person"), 33(3) ("dignity"), 40(1) ("dignity"), May 22, 2004, reprinted in 12
INT'L HUM. RTs. REP. 893 (2005), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/
loas2005.html; Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons
pmbl., June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1529, 1530 (1994) ("[F]orced disappearance of persons is
... a grave and abominable offense against the inherent dignity of the human being.");
Convention on the Rights of the Child pmbl., Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
pmbl., Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 ("[riecognizing that . . .["equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family"] derive from the inherent dignity of the
human person"); African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 5, June 27,
1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 ("Every individual shall have the
right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being."); Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women pmbl., Dec. 18, 1979, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13; American Convention on Human Rights arts. 5(2) ("All persons deprived of
their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person."),
11(1) ("Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized."),
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man pmbl., May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Res. XXX, reprinted in O.A.S. OAS/
Ser.L/V/1.4 Rev. 9 (2003).
10. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, pmbl.
11. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pmbl., Dec. 9, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights.12 Both of these global human rights
treaties also affirm "the obligation of States under the Charter of the
United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and freedoms" and proclaim that equal and inalienable rights
"derive from the inherent dignity of the human person."' 3
Quite clearly, processes of political oppression and violent attacks on
civilians during the Arab Spring violated the human dignity of oppressed
human beings and thwarted equality, freedom, justice, and peace. Such
forms of political oppression also violate other relevant human rights,
including the right of a people to political self-determination and prohibi-
tions of unlawful governmental force.' 4
B. Self-Determination and Relevant Human Rights
The precept of self-determination of peoples is enshrined in the
United Nations Charter.' 5 Moreover, the ICCPR recognizes that political
self-determination is a human right and expressly affirms that, "[bly virtue
of that right" all peoples have the right to "freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
12. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
13. ICESCR, supra note 12, pmbl.; ICCPR, supra note 11, pmbl.
14. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Middle East and
North Africa (May 19, 2011) [hereinafter Obama Middle East Speech], available at http:/
/http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-
east-and-north-africa. President Obama spoke of violations of "human dignity" and
"self-determination," the "revolution" in Tunisia and elsewhere in the Middle East and
North Africa sparked by "the actions of ordinary citizens," "universal rights," and U.S.
opposition to "the use of violence and repression against the people of the region." Id.
In his 2012 State of the Union Address, President Obama stated that "[wle will support
policies that lead to strong and stable democracies . . . because tyranny is no match for
liberty" and that "in Syria, I have no doubt that the Assad regime will soon discover that
the forces of change cannot be reversed, and that human dignity cannot be denied."
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (Jan.
24, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/
remarks-president-state-union-address.
15. U.N. Charter, arts. 1, paras. 2-3, 55, para. c, 56; see also Declaration on Princi-
ples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028, at 121 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter
Declaration on Principles of International Law]. Concerning Charter-based human
rights duties of states, see, for example, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 L.Cj. 3, 91 (May 24) (describing human rights violations as
"manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations");
Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolu-
tion 276 (1970), 1971 I.CJ. 16, 9 131 (June 21) (stating that to establish and enforce
"distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on grounds of
race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which constitute a denial of fundamen-
tal human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter")
[hereinafter Advisory Opinion South West Africa]; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
882-83 (2d Cir. 1980). The precept of self-determination has express roots dating from
the nineteenth century at the latest. See, e.g., PAUsT, supra note 1, at 206, 253 n.170.
4 Vol. 46
2013 International Law, Dignity, Democracy, and the Arab Spring
ment."16 Importantly, the right of self-determination is that of peoples and
not that of states, governments, political or religious factions, or terrorist
minorities. In fact, an illegal regime, engaged in a strategy of denial of self-
determination and violations of relevant human rights, has no right under
international law to assure its own survival. Its claims of necessity are
illegitimate.1 7
To the extent that persons are denied equal participation in their polit-
ical processes, they are "denied the sharing of political power or shared
participation in a process of political determination by an aggregate
'self."' 18 In a given case, a denial of self-determination by a government or
private actors operating in their own or foreign territory can also infringe
on human rights to freedom of expression, including the free exchange of
ideas nationally and internationally;1 9 freedom of assembly;20 citizens'
abilities to take part in governmental processes directly or through freely
chosen representatives; 21 and individual dignity and worth,22 equality,23
and freedom for all from impermissible discrimination on the basis of
political or other opinion, race, sex, or other categories listed in human
rights instruments.24 Participation in political self-determination and
enjoyment of human rights are therefore intertwined.25
16. ICCPR, supra note 11, art. 1(1); see also U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1; Promotion
of a Democratic and Equitable International Order, G.A. Res. 55/107, pmbl., 9 3(a),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/107 (Dec. 4, 2000); Declaration on Principles of International
Law, supra note 15, 9 5(1) ("the right freely to determine ... their political status");
LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw 30-33 (2d ed.
2000). The Human Rights Committee created by the ICCPR has also recognized that
"denying peoples the right to determine their own political status ... would be incom-
patible with the object and purpose of the Covenant." Human Rights Comm., General
Comment No. 24, 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 2, 1994), reprinted in
34 I.L.M. 839 (1995). Additionally, the International Court of Justice has recognized a
people's right to self-determination as an obligation erga omnes (i.e., a right owing by
and among all persons). East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 1.CJ. 90, 29 (June 30).
Moreover, the African Charter recognizes that the right of a people to self-determination
is an "inalienable" right. African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra
note 9, art. 20(1).
17. See infra Parts LD, II.
18. See Paust, The Reality of Private Rights and Duties, supra note 2, at 1247.
19. ICCPR, supra note 11, art. 19.
20. Id. art. 22.
21. Id. art. 25(a).
22. Id. pmbl.; see also supra Part LA (discussing individual dignity as part of univer-
sal human rights law).
23. ICCPR, supra note 11, pmbl., arts. 2(1), 26.
24. See id. arts. 2(1) (listing an extensive set of impermissible grounds for discrimi-
nation, including "political or other opinion"), 26; see also U.N. Charter, pmbl., arts. 1,
para. 3, 55, para. c (addressing the Charter-based guarantee of human rights and free-
dom from discrimination on the basis of race, sex, language, or religion).
25. See Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 12, T 1 ("self-determina-
tionl's] ... realization is an essential condition for the effective guarantee and obser-
vance of individual human rights"), 2 (the right of peoples and "corresponding
obligations" of states "are interrelated with other provisions of the Covenant and rules of
international law"), U.N. Doc. A/39/40, 21st Supp. (1984), reprinted in U.N. Doc. HRI/
GEN/I/Rev. 9 (Vol. 1), at 183 (May 27, 2008).
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Such an interconnection is also recognizable in other ways. For exam-
ple, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that the only legiti-
mate or authoritative government is one based on the will of the people:
"The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government;
this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by
equivalent free voting procedures." 26 The human right to a government
26. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 21(3). Concerning this democratic
basis for governmental authority, the core value of democracy, and relevant restraints on
governmental conduct, see id. art. 29(2) (stating that limitations of human rights are
only permissible in order to serve certain just requirements "in a democratic society");
Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) pmbl., Nov. 20, 2007
(adherence "to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance,
respect for and protection of human rights"), available at http://www.asean.org/archive/
publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf; Arab Charter on Human Rights, supra note 9, art.
24(7) ("No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of these rights other than those
which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society . . . .");
Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, supra note 9, pmbl.
("in the framework of democratic institutions"); African (Banjul) Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, supra note 9, art. 20(1)-(3); American Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 9, pmbl. ("within the framework of democratic institutions"), arts. 15 ("in a
democratic society"), 16(2) ("in a democratic society"), 29(c) ("representative democ-
racy as a form of government"), 32(2) ("in a democratic society"); ICESCR, supra note
12, art. 4 ("in a democratic society"); ICCPR, supra note 11, arts. 14(1) ("in a democratic
society"), 21 (same), 22(2) (same); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocols No. 11 and 14 pmbl. ("best main-
tained . . . by an effective political democracy"), arts. 6(1) ("in a democratic society"),
8(2) (same), 9(2) (same), 10(2) (same), 11(2) (same), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221,
E.T.S. No. 5 (1950); Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2(4) ("in a democratic society"), Sept. 16, 1963,
E.T.S. No. 46 (1968); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note
9, art. XXVIII ("advancement of democracy"); Jordan J. Paust, The Illegality of Apartheid
and the Present Government of South Africa, 131 CONG. REC. 34073-75 (Dec. 4, 1985);
S.C. Res. 940, pmbl. (labeling the government in Haiti as an "illegal de facto regime" and
"rleaffirming ... the goal of the international community" regarding "the restoration of
democracy in Haiti and the prompt return of the legitimately elected President"), '1 4
(authorizing states "to form a multinational force ... to use all necessary means to
facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership . . . [and] the prompt return
of the legitimately elected President"), U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994); Declaration
on the Strengthening of International Security, G.A. Res. 25/2734, E 22, U.N. GAOR,
25th Sess., Supp. No. 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2734 (Dec. 16, 1970) (condemning "all forms
of oppression, tyranny and discrimination ... wherever they occur"); Document of the
Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, intro.,(June 29, 1990) (committing to the "development of societies based on pluralistic
democracy"), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1305 (1990); CHEN, supra note 16, at 33; infra Part
IC; cf Arab Charter on Human Rights, supra note 9, art. 30(2) ("in a tolerant society
that respects human rights and freedoms").
In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, the majority opinion
of the International Court of Justice stated that "adherence by a State to any particular
doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary international law," confused "sov-
ereignty" with the "State," and assumed nonsensically that a totalitarian dictatorship
comports with "freedom of choice." (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, T 263 (June 27).
Such statements are in serious error, because the right of self-determination under the
United Nations Charter is not that of a "State" but of a people, and both self-determina-
tion and human rights law require a domestic political process based on the relative free
will of a given people. See Karima Bennoune, Remembering the Other's Others: Theo-
rizing the Approach of International Law to Muslim Fundamentalism, 41 COLUM. HUM.
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based on the relative free will of the people is necessarily mirrored in the
concomitant right of a people to freely determine their political status,
which is recognized in connection with self-determination.27 As the Inter-
national Court of Justice has recognized, "application of the right of self-
determination requires a free and genuine expression of the will of the
peoples concerned."28 Modes of enjoyment of the right of self-determina-
tion recognizably include not merely a relatively full and free participation
in a present political process, but also "[t]he establishment of a sovereign
and independent State . . . or the emergence into any other [freely deter-
mined] political status . . . ."29 These modes of enjoyment are particularly
relevant to a given people's process of self-identification 30 and their con-
sensual participation in a relatively new and independent political process.
C. Democracy as a Core Value
In 2005, the international community formally expressed its commit-
ment "to actively protecting and promoting all human rights, the rule of
law and democracy" and recognized that these "are interlinked and mutu-
ally reinforcing and that they belong to the universal and indivisible core
values and principles of the United Nations . ."31 The international com-
munity also reaffirmed "that democracy is a universal value based on the
freely expressed will of people to determine their own political, economic,
social and cultural systems," while reaffirming "the necessity of due respect
for sovereignty and the right of self-determination."3 2 Moreover, the inter-
national community declared that there is a "responsibility to protect" state
populations or "R2P": "Each individual State has the responsibility to pro-
tect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity"3 3 and, quite clearly therefore, not to commit
RTs. L. REv. 635, 695 (2010) ("[Tlhe human right to political participation is not to be
exercised toward the end of establishing totalitarian systems that seek to deny rights to
others (such as women).").
27. See Human Rights Comm., supra note 25, 9 2.
28. Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, 1975 L.CJ. 12, 9 55 (Oct. 16).
29. Declaration on Principles of International Law, supra note 15, 9 4; see also CHEN,
supra note 16, at 33-34.
30. For a discussion concerning the general phenomenon of self-identification and
"shared identity," see, for example, CHEN, supra note 16, at 33-34, 36, 38; Ved P. Nanda,
Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 257, 276 (1981).
31. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 119, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1
(Oct. 24, 2005); see also Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order,
G.A. Res. 55/107, 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/107 (Mar. 14, 2001) (stressing that "all
human rights are universal ... and that the international community must treat human
rights globally in a fair and equal manner"); World Conference on Human Rights, June
14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/
23 (uly 12, 1993) ("All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and
interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally" and "it is
the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to pro-
mote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.").
32. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 31, 135.
33. Id. 138. The U.N. Secretary General has recognized that this paragraph is
"firmly anchored in well-established principles of international law." U.N. Secretary-
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such crimes against portions of its own population.
With regard to "due respect for sovereignty," it should be noted that
sovereignty is not absolute under international law nor impervious to its
reach.34 More specifically, the pretended cloak of state sovereignty ends
where human rights begin. It is well recognized that human rights viola-
tions and international crimes are of international concern rather than
internal affairs of a single state even if they occur totally within a single
state. As the International Court of Justice recognized decades earlier, vio-
lations of basic human rights are violations of obligatio erga omnes, "are the
concern of all States," and all states "can be held to have a legal interest in
their protection . . . ."
During the Arab Spring, it became especially evident that Qaddafi's
regime in Libya not only denied democracy, human rights, and self-deter-
mination to the people of Libya, but also engaged in murderous armed
attacks against sections of the Libyan civilian population that constituted
General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 3, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12,
2009); see also S.C. Res. 1894, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1894 (Nov. 11, 2009)
("[r]eaffirming the relevant provisions of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Docu-
ment . . . , including paragraphs 138 and 139 thereof regarding the responsibility to
protect"); S.C. Res. 1706, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006) (noting that its
earlier Resolution 1674 (Apr. 28, 2006) reaffirmed "provisions of paragraphs 138 and
139 of the 2005 United Nations World Summit Outcome Document").
34. See, e.g., United States v. Von Leeb (The High Command Case) (Oct. 27, 1948),
in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CON-
TROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 462, 489 (1950) ("International law operates as a restriction
and limitation on the sovereignty of nations."); United States v. Goring, Judgment, (Oct.
1, 1946), in 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL 171, 223 (1947) ("the principle of international law, which under certain cir-
cumstances [allows immunity of] representatives of a State, cannot be applied to acts
which are condemned as criminal by International Law .... He who violates the laws of
war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the State if the
State in authorizing action moves outside its competence under International Law.");
Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser.
B) No. 4, at 24-32 (Feb. 7); BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 3-7; CHEN, supra note
16, at 314-17; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONs (Richard B. Lillich
ed., 1973); RICHARD B. LILLICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
PROBLEMS OF LAw, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 613-14 (3d ed. 1995); McDOUGAL, LASSWELL &
CHEN, supra note 1, at 181-82, 208-15, 238-42, 670; FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITA-
RIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALIT' 6 (3d ed. 2005); HENRY WHEA-
TON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 119-20 (1846) (noting that sovereignty is not an
absolute barrier to military intervention and cannot be exercised in a manner "inconsis-
tent with the equal rights of other States"); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human
Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 867-69, 875-76
(1990); Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L.
REV. 89, 106 (1989) ("territorial integrity is not entitled to absolute deference"); see also
HUGO GROTIUS, 2 THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE chs. 18 § 6, 21 § 3, 25 § 8 (Francis W.
Kelsey trans., 1925) (describing restrictions on a nation's sovereignty in cases of crimes
against ambassadors, the citizens of another country, and the nation's citizens); Anne
Peters, Humanity as the A and a of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 513, 521-22 (2009)
(noting that under a shifting paradigm, only an internally legitimate state would enjoy
full external sovereignty and freedom from intervention).
35. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 9 33
(Feb. 5).
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war crimes and crimes against humanity36 and led to the United Nations
Security Council's authorization for member states to use responsive mili-
tary force to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas in Libya.37
Despite similarly systematic and widespread murderous armed attacks on
demonstrators and other civilians in Syria, the Security Council has not
authorized member states to use force in order to protect civilians in
Syria.38
D. Unlawful Political Oppression
Clearly, the human right to participate freely in a domestic political
process and to have a government based on the relative free will of the
people is violated by a strategy designed to deny such rights and the
related right of a people to political self-determination. Such a strategy and
36. See generally S.C. Res. 2016, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/2016 (Oct. 27, 2011); S.C.
Res. 2009, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/2009 (Sept. 16, 2011); S.C. Res. 1973, [ 4, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). Resolution 1973 also reaffirmed "the responsibility of the
Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population" and declared that "the widespread
and systematic attacks currently taking place in [Libya] against the civilian population
may amount to crimes against humanity." S.C. Res. 1973, supra, pmbl; see also S.C. Res.
1970, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011) ("[rlecalling the Libyan authorities'
responsibility to protect its population"); Hannibal Travis, Wargaming the "Arab Spring":
Predicting Likely Outcomes and Planning U.N. Responses, 46 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 75, 112
(2013) (addressing "deliberately targeting a city and knowingly killing civilians" as
crimes against humanity and noting statements of the Prosecutor of the ICC); infra note
49.
37. See infra Part II.
38. See Neil MacFarquhar & Anthony Shadid, Russia and China Block U.N. Action on
Crisis in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/world/
middleeast/syria-homs-death-toll-said-to-rise.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0. At the time
when the Security Council became veto-deadlocked, President Obama condemned "the
Syrian government's unspeakable assault against the people of Homs" and declared that
Assad "has no right to lead Syria, and has lost all legitimacy with his people . . . ."
President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on Syria (Feb. 4, 2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/04/statement-president-syria; see
also G.A. Res. 66/253, Il 2 ("[s]trongly condemns the continued widespread and sys-
tematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Syrian authorities,
such as the use of force against civilians"), 7 ("[c]alls for an inclusive Syrian-led political
process"), 8 ("[flully supports the League of Arab States decision of 22 January 2012 to
facilitate a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, pluralistic political system"),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/253 (Feb. 16, 2012); Human Rights Council Draft Res. 19/1, T1 1
("[s]trongly condemns the continued widespread and systematic violations of human
rights and fundamental freedoms by the Syrian authorities, such as the use of force
against civilians, arbitrary executions, the killing and persecution of protesters, human
rights defenders and journalists, . . . arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances"), 2
("[d]eplores the brutal actions of the Syrian regime over the past 11 months, such as its
use of heavy artillery and tanks to attack residential areas of cities and towns, which
have led to the death of thousands"), 6 ("[s]tresses the importance of ensuring accounta-
bility and the need to end impunity and hold to account those responsible for human
rights violations, including those violations that may amount to crimes against human-
ity"), 19th Sess., Feb. 27-Mar. 23, 2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/L.1/Rev.1 (Feb. 29,
2012); Syrian Military Presses on Rastan; UN Rights Chief Slams Scale of Abuse, Crimes
Against Humanity, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 14, 2012, at A17 (quoting U.N. Human Rights
Commissioner Navi Pillay who warned the U.N. General Assembly that more than 5,400
people have been killed and "the scale of abuses . . . indicate that crimes against human-
ity have taken place ... and are continuing.").
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the resulting process of oppression are not tolerated under the United
Nations Charter,39 especially since respect for human dignity, equal rights
of men and women, other human rights, self-determination of peoples, and
democracy are among the major purposes and core values of the United
Nations.40
Where a government engages in a strategy to deny political participa-
tion of persons in a process of self-determination and to violate correlative
human rights, such government engages, however indirectly, in a process
of political oppression and politicide (or the destruction of an authoritative
political process) that violates self-determination and related human
rights, and therefore such government lacks authority and legitimacy
under international law.4 ' It is not a government that functions in a demo-
cratic society, and, for this reason, it is not a government that can lawfully
limit human rights to free speech, association, and assembly-rights that
can only be subject to limitations that are prescribed by law and are rea-
sonably necessary for certain purposes "in a democratic society."42
During the Arab Spring, there were the usual attempts by governmen-
tal elites in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria to control local and
transnational media,43 but advances in technology allowed numerous indi-
viduals within such countries, and some from abroad, to communicate and
coordinate action through Facebook, Twitter, and other forms of electronic
media.44 Illegitimate regimes have always sought to control the media, but
advances in technology have increased opportunities for democratic oppo-
sition and domestic and transnational participation by individuals and
groups in the effectuation of human rights and political self-determination.
Where a government uses armed force against a people as part of a
strategy to deny self-determination and human rights, it violates Article 2,
Paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the threat or
use of force "against the ... political independence" of another state "or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."45
39. See, e.g., U.N. Charter, pmbl., arts. 1, paras. 2-3, 55, para. c, 56.
40. See id.
41. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
42. For examples of human rights instruments that contain an express "in a demo-
cratic society" barrier to lawful limitations of certain human rights, see supra note 26;
see alsoJordanJ. Paust, International Law and Control of the Media: Terror, Repression and
the Alternatives, 53 IND. L.J. 621, 627-28 (1978).
43. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 36, pmbl. (condemning "acts of violence and
intimidation committed by the Libyan authorities against journalists, media profession-
als and associated personnel").
44. See, e.g., Obama Middle East Speech, supra note 14 ("[E]vents of the past six
months show us that strategies of repression ... will not work anymore. Satellite televi-
sion and the Internet provide a window into the wider world. ... Cell phones and social
networks allow young people to connect and organize like never before. And so a new
generation has emerged. And their voices tell us that change cannot be denied."); Travis,
supra note 36.
45. See U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4. Article 2, paragraph 4 is conditioned by the
phrase "in their international relations," but international relations have never been
merely state-to-state and formal actors can include states, nations, peoples, belligerents,
and other actors. See supra note 2; infra note 70.
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Because these purposes include promoting self-determination of all peo-
ples and respect for and observance of human rights,46 Article 2's pro-
scription logically extends to armed attacks by a government not merely
against a people abroad, but also against its own people or against a people
or peoples within its territory that are part of its population.4 7  Armed
attacks by a government against a number of its own civilians would not
only violate human rights law,48 but would also constitute a crime against
46. See U.N. Charter, arts. 1, paras. 2-3, 55, para. c, 56.
47. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Aggression Against Authority: The Crime of Oppression,
Politicide and Other Crimes Against Human Rights, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 283,
287-90 (1986); infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text; see also supra note 33 (dis-
cussing R2P). Such forms of armed aggression can also trigger the right of a given
people to secede from a state denying them self-determination and to seek self-determi-
nation assistance. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust & Albert P. Blaustein, War Crimes Jurisdiction
and Due Process: The Bangladesh Experience, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 20 n.69 (1978)
(the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law does not protect the territorial
integrity of a state that is denying the right of a people to self-determination and they
have rights to self-determination assistance, to collective self-defense, and to secede);
infra Part II.
48. See, e.g., Arab Charter on Human Rights, supra note 9, art. 8(1) ("No one shall be
subjected to physical or psychological torture or to cruel, degrading, humiliating or inhu-
man treatment."), (2) ("Each State party shall protect every individual subject to its juris-
diction from such practices and shall take effective measures to prevent them. The
commission of, or participation in, such acts shall be regarded as crimes."); ICCPR,
supra note 11, arts. 2(1) ("All individuals within its territory" are among those entitled to
rights under the treaty.), 6(1) (discussing arbitrary killings of civilians), 7 (discussing
cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment of civilians). In a given instance, armed
violence can also be connected to other human rights violations, such as violations of
human dignity; self-determination; freedom of speech, assembly, and association; and
freedom to take part in democratic political processes.
Additionally, human rights violations can occur at the hands of private groups and
individuals, for example, during times of governmental oppression and during or after
rebellion or revolution. See, e.g., African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, supra note 9, pmbl. ("the performance of duties on the part of everyone"), arts.
27-29; American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 9, arts. 29(a), (d), 32;
ICCPR, supra note 11, pmbl. ("the individual, having duties to other individuals and to
the community to which he belongs"), art. 5(1) (the treaty cannot be interpreted to
imply "for any ... group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant"), 14(1) ("obli-
gations" of all persons can be addressed in a court of law); Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 26, art. 17 ("Nothing in this
Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to
engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights
and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided
for in the Convention."); Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 29(1) ("[elveryone has
duties to the community"); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra
note 9, pmbl. ("duty [owed] by each individual .... Rights and duties are interrelated in
every social and political activity . . . . Duties of a juridical nature . . . duty of man");
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 20, 9 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1
(Oct. 3, 1992), reprinted in International Human Rights Instruments, U.N. Doc. HRI/
GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. 1) (May 27, 2008) (interpreting torture and cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment under ICCPR Article 7 as prohibited, "whether inflicted by people
acting . . . in a private capacity"); BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 52, 128, 177-79;
CHEN, supra note 16, at 78, 207-08, 232 ("all persons" have duties regarding genocide);
HANNUM, ANAYA & SHELTON, supra note 1, at 151 (noting that private duties were not
defined but their existence was recognized in Article 29 of the Universal Declaration),
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humanity under customary international law, for which there is universal
jurisdiction.49 Moreover, such a strategy of denial of self-determination
and human rights through the use of armed force can be threatening to
international peace and international security, both of which are also listed
among relevant purposes of the United Nations Charter.50
Importantly, the authoritative 1970 Declaration on Principles of Inter-
national Law expressly affirmed that the Charter prohibits "any forcible
action" by a state that "deprives peoples ... of their right to self-determina-
tion . .. ."51 Similarly, the 1974 Definition of Aggression adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly reiterated "the duty of States not to use
armed force to deprive peoples of their right to self-determination" and
affirmed that violations of such duty constitute international crimes of
aggression or offenses against peace.52 The end of governmental aggres-
sion against certain governments' own people during the Arab Spring not
only ended such forms of illegal force and oppression against those people,
but also served overall international peace and security.
E. The Right of Rebellion or Revolution
A significant number of scholars have recognized that "the right of a
people to revolt against tyranny is now a recognized principle of interna-
tional law."5 3 As noted elsewhere,
166 (duties were recognized in the American Declaration); MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 163, 174-79 (1988); McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra
note 1, at 96-107, 585, 587, 807-10; THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL
STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 34 (1987); Paust, The Reality of Private Rights
and Duties, supra note 2, at 1242-43; Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private
Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARv. HuM. RTs. J. 51 (1992).
49. For more information about crimes against humanity involving attacks against
civilians, see, for example, Jordan J. Paust, The International Criminal Court Does Not
Have Complete jurisdiction Over Customary Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, 43
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 681, 684-97 (2010); supra note 36.
50. See U.N. Charter, art. 1, para. 1.
51. See Declaration on Principles of International Law, supra note 15.
52. See Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631, at 142, (1975). For a discussion concerning early
recognition that private individuals can be criminally sanctioned for acts of aggression
and other offenses against peace, see, for example, Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099,
1108-15, 1117, 1118, 1120 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) (Wilson, J., charge to grand
jury) (regarding a relevant "duty of humanity," "acts of hostility" and "aggression," and
crimes against "peace"); Territorial Rights-Florida, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (1797) ("an
offence against the law of nations" and "the peace of mankind"); Breach of Neutrality, 1
Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795) (offense "against the public peace").
53. Gerald Sumida, The Right to Revolution: Implications for International Law and
World Order, in POWER AND LAW: AMERICAN DILEMMA IN WORLD AFFAIRS 130, 134 (Charles
A. Barker ed., 1971), reprinted in MYREs S. McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE - THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMU-
NITY 176, 168 (1981); accord Antonio Cassese, Terrorism and Human Rights, 31 Am. U. L.
REV. 945, 946-47 (1982); Edward Collins, Jr. & Timothy M. Cole, Regime Legitimation in
Instances of Coup-Caused Governments-in-Exile: The Cases of Presidents Makarios and
Aristide, 5 J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 199, 210 (1996); Adama Dieng, Role ofJudges and Lawyers
in Defending the Rule of Law, 21 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 550, 551 (1997); Alejandro Lorite
Escorihuela, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: The Politics of Distinction, 19
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[Tihe right of revolution is an important international precept and a part of
available strategies for the assurance both of the authority of the people as
the lawful basis of any government and of the process of national self-deter-
mination. Under international law, the permissibility of armed revolution is
necessarily interrelated with legal precepts of authority and self-determina-
tion, as well as with more specific sets of human rights. For example, the
right to change a governmental structure is necessarily interrelated with the
question of the legitimacy of that structure in terms of the accepted standard
of authority in international law and with the precept of self-determination,
both of which are interrelated and are also interconnected with human
rights of individuals to participate in the political processes of their
society.54
These international precepts also limit the permissibility of rebellion
or revolution. For example, the rights of revolution and self-determination
are rights of the people; therefore, they are rights that are often exercised by
MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 299, 349-51 (2011); Mary Ann Glendon, The Rule of Law in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 2 Nw. J. INT'L Hum. RTs. 2, 4 (2004); Tony
HonorE, The Right to Rebel, 8 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 34 (1988); M. Rafiqul Islam, Seces-
sion Crisis in Papua New Guinea: The Proclaimed Republic of Bougainville in International
Law, 13 U. HAw. L. REV. 453, 473 (1991); Chimine I. Keitner & W. Michael Reisman,
Free Association: The United States Experience, 39 TEX. INT'L LJ. 1, 13 n.53 (2003); David
Kopel et al., Is Resisting Genocide a Human Right?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1325
(2006) (citing JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORI-
GINS, DRAFTING AND INTENT 307-12 (1999)); Matthew Lippman, The Right of Civil Resis-
tance Under International Law and the Domestic Necessity Defense, 8 DICK. J. INT'L L. 349
(1990); Jordan J. Paust, The Human Right to Participate in Armed Revolution and Related
Forms of Social Violence: Testing the Limits of Permissibility, 32 EMORY LJ. 545, 560-70
(1983); Quincy Wright, Subversive Intervention, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 521, 529 (1960)
("international law recognizes the right of revolution"); see also Definition of Aggression,
supra note 52, art. 7 (recognizing "the right to self-determination ... of peoples forcibly
deprived of that right" and "the right of these peoples to struggle to that end"); Declara-
tion on Principles of International Law, supra note 15 (peoples forcibly deprived of self-
determination are entitled to take "actions against, and [in] resistance to, such forcible
action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, [and] such peoples
are entitled to seek and to receive support"); ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 211 (1963)
(noting the then "widespread view that there may now be a legal right of revolution; that
is to say, that under the principle of self-determination the peoples of a territory must be
allowed-if absolutely necessary by forceful means-to replace the government by one of
their own choice."); TESON, supra note 34, at 5 (addressing permissible intervention
when people "are being denied basic human rights and who themselves would be ration-
ally willing to revolt against their oppressive government"); Karima Bennoune, Toward A
Human Rights Approach to Armed Conflict: Iraq 2003, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
171, 201 n.144 (2004) (the preamble of the Universal Declaration "may be read to
implicitly reserve the possibility of resort to armed force"); Hurst Hannum, Rethinking
Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 45 (1993) ("some reaction against oppression is
undoubtedly justified; even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights refers to 'rebel-
lion against tyranny and oppression"'); Natalie Oman, The 'Responsibility to Prevent': A
Remit for Intervention?, 22 CAN. J. L. &JURISPRUDENCE 355, 360 (2009) (noting that if a
state "fails to execute its redefined responsibility to protect ... the populace has a legiti-
mate right of revolution"); Bereket Habte Selassie, Self-Determination in Principle and
Practice: The Ethiopian-Eritrean Experience, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 91, 99 (1997)
("[A] violation of human rights may give rise to a 'just rebellion."').
54. Paust, supra note 53, at 562.
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a majority or in their name against an oppressive minority elite.55 Yet, the
majority should seek to "ensure authoritative government, political self-
determination, and the human rights of all members of the community
equally and freely to participate."5 6 Also, international law places limits
on the methods and means of violence and the types of treatment of
human beings that must be considered when addressing the propriety of
private individual and group participation in rebellion or revolution and in
post-rebellion or post-revolution processes.57 The legitimacy of a rebellion
or revolution does not legitimize the use of certain tactics or conduct that
are absolutely proscribed under international law.58 Of particular impor-
tance during and after the Arab Spring is the need to protect fundamental
universal rights of women to dignity and equality and their absolute, non-
derogable, and peremptory jus cogens rights to freedom from torture and
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment59 at the hands of radical funda-
mentalists.60 Effective protection of women's human rights will require
continued affirmation of (1) the existence of human rights duties of private
groups and persons,61 and (2) the primacy of fundamental universal and
peremptory jus cogens rights of women over contradictory claims in the
name of the limited right to practice one's religion.62
55. Id. at 567.
56. Id. at 566, 569-70.
57. See BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 1; Paust, supra note 53, at 578-80; see also
Daniel H. Derby, A Democratic Response to Foreign Political Offenses: The Need for Legisla-
tion to Counter Anti-Terrorism Excesses, 1 TOURO J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 26 (1988); Kevin J.
Greene, Terrorism as Impermissible Political Violence: An International Law Framework,
16 VT. L. REv. 461, 489 (1992); Patricia Y. Reyhan, Genocidal Violence in Burundi: Should
International Law Prohibit Domestic Humanitarian Intervention?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 771,
780-84 (1997); Travis, supra note 36, at 141 (affirming international duties to prevent,
promote, and protect the right to rebellion, but also warning of potentially dire conse-
quences, especially for women, if, "after the flight of many middle-class secularists and
religious minorities" and impermissible social violence, post-revolution elections "will
be swept by the best-funded and organized radical theocratic groups," who engage in
violations of human rights and self-determination).
58. For example, the legitimacy of a self-determination struggle does not legitimize
tactics that violate non-derogable human rights or are designed to result in the imper-
missible terrorization of others or related crimes against humanity. See, e.g., Jordan J.
Paust, Terrorism's Proscription and Core Elements of an Objective Definition, 8 SANTA
CLARAJ. INT'L L. 51, 52, 59-60 (2010). With respect to armed rebellion and revolution,
conduct that is not intended to produce terror and does not result in terror should not
be labeled terrorism. See id. at 58-59. For this reason, mere opposition to an illegiti-
mate regime through selective acts of violence is not terrorism.
59. For a discussion concerning the non-derogable and jus cogens nature of such
absolute human rights, see, for example, ICCPR, supra note 11, arts. 4(2), 7; RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(d), § 702
cmts. a, n (1987); Jordan J. Paust, The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and
Appropriate Sanctions, 43 VAL. U. L. REv. 1535 (2009).
60. See, e.g., Bennoune, supra note 26, at 677 (women are "often swallowed by what
is considered 'culture' or disappeared by what is called 'religion"'), 696 (international
lawyers need to recognize both "state and non-state forms of coercion of women").
61. For a discussion concerning the existence of private duties under treaty-based
and customary human rights law, see, for example, supra notes 2-3, 48, 60.
62. Freedom from distinction on the basis of sex or religion is recognized in Articles
1(3) and 55(c) of the United Nations Charter, but the human right to freedom of relig-
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II. Regime Change in Libya and Self-Determination Assistance to the
People of Libya
In March 2011, the United States and other members of NATO began
a campaign using significant military force in Libya that clearly amounted
to participation in an international armed conflict under international
law.63 In Resolution 1973, the United Nations Security Council author-
ized the use of military force to protect civilians and civilian-populated
areas.64 The Security Council has authority to authorize enforcement mea-
sures under Articles 39 and 42 of the United Nations Charter in response
to "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."65
ion is expressly subject to limitations, for example, "the fundamental rights and free-
doms of others." ICCPR, supra note 11, art. 18(3); see also Universal Declaration, supra
note 1, art. 29(2) ("In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject
. . . to such limitations . . . determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others .... ). Additionally, the
exercise of religion is subject to limitations required by peremptory rights and duties jus
cogens, such as the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 59, § 702(d). The Arab Charter on Human Rights recognizes the
equal dignity and general equality of men and women, but adds an ambiguous phrase
concerning "the positive discrimination established in favour of women by the Islamic
Shariah, other divine laws and by applicable laws and legal instruments." Arab Charter
on Human Rights, supra note 9, art. 3(3). It should be noted, however, that such a
potentially limiting phrase cannot limit the reach of the United Nations Charter (which,
under Article 103 of the Charter, must prevail over any inconsistent international agree-
ment), global rights and duties under the ICCPR, or customary human rights jus cogens
(which will prevail over any inconsistent international agreement). Also, the preamble
to the Arab Charter reaffirms "the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the provisions of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights," and Article 43 of the Arab Charter expressly states that
"[niothing in this Charter may be construed or interpreted as impairing the rights and
freedoms . . . set forth in the international . . . human rights instruments which the
states parties have adopted or ratified, including the rights of women." Arab Charter on
Human Rights, supra note 9, art. 43.
63. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Constitutionality of U.S. Participation in the United
Nations-Authorized War in Libya, 26 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 43, 43-45 (2012); Elisabeth
Bumiller & David D. Kirkpatrick, Allies Pressure Qaddafi Forces Around Rebel Cities, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/world/africa/24libya.
html; Charlie Savage & Thom Shanker, Scores of U.S. Strikes in Libya Followed Handoff to
NATO, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/2l/world/africa/
21powers.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State Legal Advisor Harold Hongju Koh,
Statement Regarding Use of Force in Libya (Mar. 26, 2011), available at http://www.
state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/159201.htm ("U.S. forces have targeted the Qaddafi
regime's air defense systems, command and control structures, and other capabilities of
Qaddafi's armed forces used to attack civilians and civilian populated areas.").
64. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 36, 4 (expressly authorizing "[miember States ... to
take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under
threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya"). The Resolution also noted "the escala-
tion of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties" and the "widespread and systematic
attacks currently taking place" in Libya. Id. pmbl. The Security Council also con-
demned "the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary deten-
tions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions." Id.
65. See U.N. Charter, arts. 39 ("The Security Council shall determine the existence
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles
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With respect to Libya, the Council decided that attacks on and continued
threats to civilians and civilian-populated areas in Libya "continue[d] to
constitute a threat to international peace and security"66 and the Council
decided to authorize all necessary measures of protective force, including
creation of a no-fly zone.67
Later in 2011, the United States and other members of NATO contin-
ued to use armed force in Libya and it grew from protection of civilians to
support for rebel forces, which contributed to rebel control of Tripoli and
regime change some seven months after NATO members' use of armed
force had begun.68 Over this period of months, it became reasonably nec-
essary to provide support for regime change in Libya to effectively protect
civilians who were under a series of murderous armed attacks and serious
threats of imminent future attacks by the Qaddafi regime. In addition to
the United Nations Security Council authorization to use all necessary
measures of protective force, which covered the subsequent need to sup-
port regime change to protect civilians from armed attacks, during later
stages of the Libyan armed conflict there was a change in the international
legal status of the Libyan rebel-insurgents to belligerents, and they con-
41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."), 42 (the Security
Council "may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to main-
tain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include . . . blockade,
and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.").
66. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 36, pmbl.
67. Id. 99 6-8. Because "all necessary measures" had been authorized, it would be
improper to claim that the Security Council had only authorized the creation of a no-fly
zone.
68. See, e.g., Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, Seeing Limits to 'New' Kind of War in
Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/world/africa/
nato-war-in-libya-shows-united-states-was-vital-to-toppling-qaddafi.html# (U.S. predator
drone "helped to guide a French warplane to attack Colonel Qaddafi's convoy"); Eric
Schmitt & Steven Lee Myers, Sharper Surveillance and NATO Coordination Helped Rebels
Race to Capital, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/22/
world/africa/22nato.html (stating that the United States provided intensified aerial sur-
veillance in and around Tripoli during the rebel takeover of Tripoli, NATO coordinated
with the rebels, and "[t]hrough Saturday, NATO and its allies had flown 7,459 strike
missions . . . attacking thousands of targets"); Larry Shaughnessy, U.S. Has Nearly
Doubled Air Attacks on Libya in Past 12 Days, CNN (Aug. 23, 2011), http://articles.cnn.
com/2011-08-22/politics/us.ibya.costs_ 1_attacks-civilians-libyan-mission?s=PM:POLI
TICS ("[tihere was an average of 1.7 strike sorties a day from April 1 to August 10,
compared with 3.1 strike sorties in the past 12 days" and attacks by predator drones has
more than doubled); Jim Garamone, Situation Fluid, but Gadhafi Regime Nears End,
Obama Says, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.defense.gov/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=65104 ("More than 5,300 American sorties have been flown as part
of Operation Unified Protector; 1,210 were strike sorties and 101 were Predator
unmanned aerial vehicle strikes. The targets included air defenses, arms caches and
ground forces."). The General in command of NATO's air operation in Libya has noted
that selective use of force by NATO involved continual protection of civilians and civil-
ian-populated areas from armed attacks by pro-Qaddafi forces (PGF). Anti-Qaddafi
forces (AGF) were not attacked because "[w]e saw when the . . . [AGF] entered towns,
they liberated the town and the people. They did not indiscriminately attack civilians
and in fact, kept the civilians away from any of the fighting between the AGF and PGF."
E-mail from Lieutenant General Ralph J. Jodice II to author (Apr. 20, 2012, 09:50 CST)
(on file with author).
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sented to and welcomed U.S. and NATO uses of force.69 Still later, the
Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) gained recognition as the legit-
imate representative of the Libyan people, 70 and its consent provided addi-
tional independent legitimacy for the use of force to support regime
change, provide self-determination assistance to the Libyan people, and
participate in collective self-defense7 t against continuous armed attacks by
remnants of the Qaddafi regime.
Self-determination assistance can be permissible under international
law.72 The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law affirms
that self-determination assistance can be permissible under the United
Nations Charter when recognizing that "[iun their actions against, and
resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to
self-determination, such peoples [seeking self-determination] are entitled
to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and princi-
ples of the Charter."73 Moreover, the 1970 Declaration implies that the
territorial integrity of states can be disrupted if they do not conduct them-
selves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determina-
tion of peoples.74 The 1974 Declaration of Aggression also seems to allow
for the right of a people to self-determination assistance by declaring that
"[niothing in this definition ... could in any way prejudice the right to self-
69. Paust, supra note 63, at 43 n.4.
70. For sources discussing the recognition in July 2011 by thirty-two countries
(including the United States) of the NTC as "the legitimate governing authority in
Libya," see, for example, Press Release, Republic of Turk. Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Fourth Meeting of the Libya Contact Group Chair's Statement (July 15, 2011), available
at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/fourth-meeting-of-the-libya-contact-group-chair-s-statement_-
15-july-2011_-istanbul.en.mfa; see also William Wan & William Booth, Libyan Rebels
Given Full U.S. Recognition, WASH. PosT, June 16, 2011, at A9; Stefan Talmon, Recogni-
tion of the Libyan National Transitional Council, 15 ASIL INSIGHTS (June 16, 2011), availa-
ble at http://www.asil.org/insightsl10616.cfm. With respect to recognition of the NTC
of Libya and Security Council encouragement of the NTC (or "the Libyan authorities") to
implement its plans, for example, to protect Libyan civilians, restore governmental ser-
vices, prevent violations of human rights, and ensure an inclusive political process
involving free elections, see, for example, S.C. Res. 2009, supra note 36, CH 5, 7.
71. See Paust & Blaustein, supra note 47, at 11-12 n.39 ("Contextual reality and the
serving of all goal values require a new reading of article 51 of the Charter" where a
given people are denied self-determination by an oppressive elite using military force,
"especially in the light of massive violations of human rights of their people. Outside
states cannot precipitate violence, but where an armed attack has occurred against a
people seeking self-determination it is not improper to assist those being attacked.")
(parentheses omitted). Recognition of the right of self-defense and collective self-
defense of a people entitled to self-determination who are under armed attack is all the
more appropriate given that such peoples have formal participatory roles in the interna-
tional legal process. Moreover, international law and international relations have never
been merely state-to-state. With respect to documentation of these facts, see, for exam-
ple, Paust, Nonstate Actors, supra note 2, at 979-81, 1000. International relations also
recognizably exist once a status of belligerency is reached. At such a moment at least,
all of the customary laws of war are applicable. Id. at 981 n.7.
72. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 533, 547-48 (2002).
73. Declaration on Principles of International Law, supra note 15.
74. Declaration on the Principles of International Law, supra note 15; see Paust &
Blaustein, supra note 47, at 19-20 n.69.
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determination . .. of peoples forcibly deprived of that right . . . nor the
right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive sup-
port, in accordance with the principles of the Charter .... ."7
In 1984, the United Nations General Assembly responded to the illegal
regime in South Africa by affirming the permissibility of self-determina-
tion assistance and "recognizing the legitimacy of [the people of South
Africa's] struggle to eliminate apartheid and establish a society based on
majority rule with equal participation by all the people of South Africa," 76
urging "all Governments and organizations ... to assist the oppressed peo-
ple of South Africa in their legitimate struggle for national liberation,"77
and condemning "the South African racist regime for . .. persisting with
the further entrenchment of apartheid, a system declared a crime against
humanity and a threat to international peace and security."78
With respect to Libya and other countries in Africa, the African Char-
ter on Human and Peoples' Rights provides additional support for some
forms of self-determination assistance. As the African Charter affirms,
"[O]ppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds
of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international
community,"7 9 which would include rebellion or revolution, and "[a]ll peo-
ples shall have the right to assistance of the States parties to the present
Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, . . ."8 0
As I noted previously,
Various ... Security Council resolutions and international instruments and
decisions indicate that use of force to overthrow a foreign government and to
provide self-determination assistance to a people is not absolutely impermis-
sible under the [United Nations] Charter.8 ' However, permissibility must
rest on a relatively free will of a given people and their request for assistance,
unless there is an independent basis for support in an authoritative Security
Council or regional authorization. 82
Conclusion
Various individuals and groups during the Arab Spring have reaf-
firmed international expectations regarding individual dignity and worth;
self-determination of peoples; human rights with respect to relatively free
and genuine participation in governmental processes and the standard of
legitimacy for governments; democracy as a universal core value; and the
75. Definition of Aggression, supra note 52, art. 7.
76. Situation in South Africa, G.A. Res. 39/2, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/2 (Sept.
28, 1984).
77. Id. 9 7.
78. Id. T 3.
79. African (Banjul) Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 9, art. 20(2).
80. Id. art. 20(3).
81. See Paust, supra note 72, at 548 n.72.
82. Id. at 548. For information concerning the propriety of certain forms of
regional action authorized by regional organizations under Article 52 of the United
Nations Charter, such as NATO, the OAS, the OAU, and the Arab League, see, for exam-
ple, id. at 545-47.
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right of rebellion or revolution against an oppressive government and the
concomitant right of a given people to seek self-determination assistance.
Efforts to achieve each are still unfolding, as they progress in all sectors of
the human community. In fact, their effectuation is not merely an outcome
at a given social moment, but rather a process involving the evolution of
human relations. More generally, human dignity and democratic freedoms
must be continually nurtured through affirmative, optimistic involvement
with others.

